University of Montana

ScholarWorks at University of Montana
Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, &
Professional Papers

Graduate School

1995

China's changing shape: From socialism to capitalism
Robert R. Edmonson
The University of Montana

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Edmonson, Robert R., "China's changing shape: From socialism to capitalism" (1995). Graduate Student
Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers. 5150.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/5150

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at ScholarWorks at University of
Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers by an
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.

CHINA'S CHANGING SHAPE FROM SOCIALISM TO CAPITALISM
By
Robert R. Edmonson
B.S., Business Administration
University of Montana, 1994

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of
Master of Business Administration
University of Montana
1995

Approved by:

L

____

Chairperson, Bcwd of Examinees

Demi, Graduate School

•m n jf
Date

^

V,

UMI Number: EP40614

All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS
The quality of this reproduction is dependent,upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.

UMT
D issertation ; fttM ish sng

UMI EP40614
Published by ProQuest LLC (2014). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code

Fro
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346

CONTENT
Abstract
C h ap ter I

C h ap ter II

iii
I n tr o d u c tio n ......................................

1

Problem Statement

................................................................................

1

Statement of P u rp o s e ........... ..................................................................

2

China's Changing S h a p e ........................................................................

4

Com paring the Soviet Union and C hina's T ransition Strategies
Economics
Politics

7

.......................................

7

..............................................................................................

9

A dm inistration............................................................................................11
China's Distinct Advantages
C h ap ter III

. ..

.........................................................13

China Shifts F rom Communism to C a p ita lis m .................................. 15
Township and Village E n te rp rise s...........................................

16

U nem ploym ent............................ ............................................. ..............19
C h ap ter IV

C hina's Stock M a r k e t s ................................................................

22

Goal of the Stock Market . . . ............................................................. 23
Current and Future S ite s .......................................................................... 24
Types of S h a r e s

.......................................................................... 26

Difficulties E n c o u n te red .......................................................................... 30
Stock Market S ta lls ...................................................

32

Long-Range Challenges

34

Chapter V

Development of Other Financial M a r k e ts.....................................41
Bond . . .

............................................................................................... 41

Foreign E x c h a n g e ....................................................................................47
Futures

Chapter VI

........................................................................................................49

Is China Heading for Collapse? ........................................................ 51
Peasant Discontent

....................................................................................54

Widespread Corruption and G r e e d .......................................................... 56

Conclusion

.................................................................................
Future of China's Reforms

References

59

..................................................................... 60

................................................................................................................ 63

ii

Edmonson, Robert R., Master degree, May 1995

Business Administration

China's Changing Shape - From Socialism to Capitalism
Chairperson: Dr. Maureen J.
Despite two hundred years of foreign relations problems, division at home and
extreme poverty within its population, China is fast becoming the world's largest
economy as it makes a switch from communism to quasi-capitalism.
Other communist countries, such as Russia, have shown that the transition
from a communist state to one that embraces capitalism does not always go smoothly.
But the Chinese have been much more successful than other communist countries in
shifting to a free market system. So far they have proven that a socialist economic
system really can be transformed into a market system without total social disaster.
Part of their success can be attributed to not trying to switch to capitalism all at once,
but instead introducing economic reforms by dividing them into manageable phases.
The primary differences between Chinese and Soviet performances are linked
to a profoundly different economic and political strategy on the part of China. Instead
of using other communist countries as a model, China's strategy of development has
been uniquely Asian.
China's economic turnaround began when its leadership abandoned Marxism
and formed Special Economic Zones (SEZs) around the country. In these areas, the
government has relaxed its grip and allowed entrepreneurs the independence to
operate in a capitalistic way without interference from Beijing. Also in these zones,
many state-owned enterprises are being privatized, local managers are ignoring
regulations from central authority and Chinese millionaires are being created
overnight.
All this rapid economic growth, accompanied by an open door policy is
attracting both Western and Asian nations with major investment and trading
opportunities. To accomodate these new trading partners, China reopened its stock
exchanges and began developing other financial markets.
But this economic boom, while boosting living standards and creating
enormous opportunities, is also generating a multitude of problems. The country is
constantly battling rising inflation, increasing unemployment, growing peasant unrest
and widespread corruption and greed. Because of these difficulties and continued
ideological differences among China's leaders, there is still a significant possibility
that China will not manage a successful economic change as experts first believed.
Given these enormous implications, instituting dramatic changes within China's
borders may be more difficult than Deng Xiaoping first imagined.
To give the reader a clear understanding of China's transition, this paper
concentrates on, the techniques China is using to convert to a "market system", how
these changes are impacting its social, economic and political structures, and why this
rising nation may be heading toward catastrophe.

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Problem Statement
For the past two centuries China has experienced weakness abroad and
fragmentation at home, and its people have lived in unspeakable poverty.
Since the Communist Party's liberation of China from the Nationalist
government in 1949, party leaders have never let membership rise above 5 % of
China's population. Today, party membership represents only 4.3% of the China's
population ("The road from Tiananmen", 1994).
Under the communist regime, the Chinese people were not allowed a life
without scrutiny from the government. For instance, individuals could not choose
*

where they lived or worked. Neighborhood committees watched and reported every
move. Traveling was inconceivable without a mountain of paperwork and
authorizations. All forms of media were government controlled and used essentially
for propaganda. All jobs were regulated by the communist party and private
businesses were seized and converted to state-owned enterprises. In the rural areas,
the government bought all produce and confiscated private land. Clearly, a person
belonged in every way to his or her "work unit", which assigned housing, education
and health care. It was through these mechanisms that the communists controlled
China's more than one billion inhabitants.
Deng Xiaoping rose to power in 1978 and decided that China must begin a
program of economic reforms. Deng's dramatic reversal in ideology was the catalyst
that swung China's door open to foreign trade and investment and with it began an
1
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age of incredible economic growth ("The road from Tiananmen", 1994).
But even with economic reforms, as late as 1985, more than one hundred
million Chinese still subsisted on an annual income under US $30, less than the cost
of a good dinner in New York City. Today about 40 million people live in caves in
northeast China, and the people in 520 of China's 1903 counties have incomes below
US $35 per person annually. In some areas, the average value of the total possessions
of a peasant household is under US $3. Such extreme poverty created a phenomenon
known as the "one-pants family" in many rural areas of China. The one-pants family
has been studied by Chinese sociologists (but never published in the West), it is a
family owning only adequate clothing for one member of the family. Since the man
must work during the day, he typically gets to wear pants to the fields, while the wife
hides her shame. Then in the evening the wife gets to wear the pants. In another
instance, villagers too poor to own any clothing blacken themselves with charcoal to
create the illusion of black clothing (Overholt, 1993).

Statement of Purpose
Paramount to China's transition to capitalism is the strategies its leadership is
using to make the shift as successful as possible. Therefore, the overall purpose of
this paper is to illustrate the techniques China's leadership is using in its quest to
function as a "socialist market system", examine how these changes are affecting the
country's social, economic and political structures, and how this rising nation could be
heading for disaster.
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In chapter two, the transition methods used by China as opposed to the former
Soviet Union's techniques are examined and compared. The main differences are
dramatically different economic and political strategies and that the Chinese have
introduced change in manageable phases rather than all at once.
Highlighted in chapter three will be China's use of Special Economic Zones
which are designed to promote "Western" style capitalism. This chapter will also
examine China's move to privatization and how township and village enterprises
(TVEs) are an important contributing factor in making reformation possible in the
rural areas of China.
Chapters four and five cover China's reopening of a stock market system and
the establishment of its financial markets. Both of these financial systems are vitally
important to China's economic reforms and will potentially accelerate privatization
and facilitate converting state ownership to individual ownership.
The concluding chapters focus on China's growing internal problems and how
they could spell serious trouble for the country. For example, although China
continues to show signs of economic success, it still faces significant problems with
peasant discontent, worker unrest and serious widespread corruption. It seems the
Communists have forgotten who helped them gain power in 1949 during the Cultural
Revolution -- the peasants. The very faction they helped into power is now oppressing
them much like the previous leadership.
Although the growing peasant discontent and worker unhappiness are important
issues that need to be addressed, corruption is the most serious concern and is
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affecting China's internal efficiency. Corruption is rampant and on the rise in China.
While corruption is not uncommon in developing countries, it only serves to amplify
the general state of discontent among China's population. While many experts agree
China's growth is unstoppable with few obstacles to prevent it from becoming the
world's largest economy — corruption could threaten future success. Others believe
that if corruption is not brought under control it could provide the impetus for another
incident like Tiananmen Square that could result in nationwide chaos and possible
governmental collapse.

China's Changing Shape
All this poverty and extreme hardship is becoming a thing of the past. Today,
the vast majority of Chinese are more interested in boosting their living standard than
in organizing movements (like the June 1989 Tiananmen Incident) against their
communist run government. The household savings rate, which remained relatively
stable for more than 25 years, experienced a sharp increase after economic reforms in
1979. Chinese households typically save 40% of their disposable income — one of the
world's highest rates — and have generated a pool of private savings that is worth at
least 1 trillion yuan (US $180 billion) ("A new day", 1992).
Traditionally, a country's economy is measured by determining a per capita
income which is calculated by converting the value of its gross domestic product into
US dollars at the official exchange rate. But, a big problem with this method is that if
a country's currency weakens against the dollar, its economy automatically shrinks,
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which can be very misleading. That is precisely what happened between 1978 and
1992 in China, as the yuan (China's currency) fell from 1.7 to the dollar to 5.5 to the
dollar. Therefore, the traditional measurement effectively negates China's real
economic growth during this period. By this calculation, China's economy is the 10th
largest, and its people among the poorest.
In 1993, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) devised a different method to
calculate a country's economy. The IMF measured each country's national output by
what goods and services its currency will buy at home compared with the purchasing
power of other countries' currencies. This method known as the purchasing power
parity (PPP) found China to be a producer of US $1.7 trillion in goods and services in
1992, far greater than the US $400 billion previously estimated, and that its per capita
income was US $1600, not US $370 - thereby, ranking China's economy no. 3 in
world ("Agency ranks China's economy", 1993).
With very few outlets for this capital, the result has been a boom of domestic
and foreign investment in Chinese companies and especially its new stock exchange
system. According to Robert Broadfoot, managing director of Political and Economic
Risk Consultancy Ltd. in Hong Kong, " there is a lot of money sloshing around in
China - it is estimated that there are people driving around with as much as $65,000
on the back of their bicycles" ("A new day"). By all appearances, there is no
shortage of Chinese or outsiders willing to take advantage of China's very healthy
economy.
This economic boom will have other effects. It is already changing the politics

of China, and promises to reshape the politics of all of Asia and perhaps the world.
Economic success has given reformers the initiative and put both bureaucratic and
radical factions on the defensive. It has given coastal areas the initiative over the
interior, including Beijing, and has given economics priority over politics in a country
whose central post-revolutionary slogan was "politics in command". The government
has relaxed its grip over provinces, state-owned enterprises and the individual. China
has opened itself to the degree that a cosmopolitan culture is developing in coastal
cities and in many major inland cities and almost all universities and research centers.
In these areas it appears that Marxism is dead. It has created a differing perspective
among China's leadership, the octogenarians (the generation in their mid-sixties), the
fifty-year olds, and those under forty-five.
Internationally, China has removed itself from conflicts and geopolitical
objectives to concentrate on the pursuit of total economic success. Further, it has
stopped promoting revolution around the world, opened friendly relations with its
neighbors, and not only slashed military spending, but also has reduced its overall

CHAPTER II
COMPARING THE SOVIET UNION
AND CHINA'S TRANSITION STRATEGIES
The Chinese have tried Communism, and haven't liked it any better than
anyone else. Other countries, such as Russia, have shown that the transition from a
communist state to one of capitalism does not always go smoothly. Conversely, the
Chinese have been much more successful than other communist countries in shifting to
a free market system. They have proven that a socialist economic system really can
be transformed into a market system without social catastrophe. Instead of trying to
switch to capitalism all at once, the Chinese have introduced economic reform by
dividing it into manageable stages.
The differences between Chinese and Soviet performance are primarily linked
to a profoundly different economic and political strategy. Instead of using other
communist countries as a model, China's strategy of development has been uniquely
Asian. Using the lessons learned by its four neighbors, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong
Kong and Singapore, China has derived strategies in four areas: economics, politics,
administration and financial markets (Overholt).

Economics
In the area of economics, China gave priority to industries and sectors where
limited government investments would produce rapid growth. Initially, they
privatized farming which generated enormous increases in productivity, income and
output without financial involvement by the government. Next, China encouraged
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foreign direct investment which resulted in huge increases in output and exports and
the costs to do so were inconsequential to the government. China also turned its
attention to light and medium industry where small investments usually return
handsome outputs. Following two of its neighbors, Hong Kong and Taiwan, China
flooded the market with textiles, garments, shoes, toys and consumer electronics and
quickly became a global force. The result was an explosion of growth, consumer
goods production, personal income, exports and foreign exchange earnings (Overholt).
By comparison, the Soviets ignored agriculture, discouraged foreign investment
and turned its attention to, the capital intensive, heavy industries. When the issue of
privatization was approached, the Soviets again concentrated on industries with huge
capital investments and long lead-times, rather than segments of low costs and rapid
payback. Overall, the Soviet strategy resulted in a disintegration of production
concurrent with severe inflation (Overholt).
The differences in each country's revolution may also explain why China has
been more successful than the Soviet Union. The Chinese revolution, unlike the
Soviet Union's, had deep roots in peasant society. Whereas, the Soviet revolution
was a brutally imposed coup launched from the upper echelons. As a result, China's
peasants became energized and later when reforms came they still had their
entrepreneurial spirit and were able to immediately channel this energy into a drive
for wealth. China's growth curve compared to the Soviet Union's can be likened to a
jet ascending as opposed to a rock descending.
Another important strategy employed by China was the creation of millions of

jobs for the people who needed them most. Under this strategy, income and growth
are focused on the ordinary farmer and ordinary workers. In the Soviet Union, the
concentration is on heavy industry which creates a much smaller number of higherpaid jobs and leaves the majority of the work force unemployed (Overholt).

Politics
China's leader, Deng Xiaoping, believes that reform is a domestic political
process and in order to succeed, it must be divided into manageable phases, building
in each phase a politically overwhelming coalition of groups who support and view
reform as serving their own self interests. Gorbachev, the Soviet Union's former
leader, while a notable international figure, tried to overhaul his country's system all
at once. Throughout history, those reformers who also attempted to implement a
sweeping range of reforms have mobilized opposition and met with failure and defeat.
Deng's introductory reforms in China more than doubled the incomes of its
farmers (peasants), thereby winning support of a group of over eight hundred million
people, his first coalition. Next, Deng stimulated the expansion of small and medium
industry and consequently gained the support of tens of millions of workers and
managers throughout China. To gain the support of China's intellectuals and students,
Deng loosened the constraints on travel and the exchange of ideas. Even after the
Tiananmen Square incident, these groups remained solid supporters of economic

reforms (Overholt).
In spite of a huge reduction in military spending to finance economic
improvement, the Chinese leader even managed to win over the military leadership.
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Deng convinced the military that in order to become a world class power it needed to
acquire advanced Western weaponry. According to Deng to obtain these weapons,
China must improve its economic condition through drastic military budget cuts and
manpower reductions to help finance its domestic economic success (Overholt).
The Chinese top leadership knew that something extreme must be initiated to
save both the country and themselves and therefore were staunch advocates of Deng's
reform plans.

The liberals strongly agreed that a market economy was right for

China, while the conservative party recognized that the only way to preserve their
constituencies was through providing economic benefits and the only way to provide
these benefits was through reform. Further support came from the families of both
groups when they discovered that reform also brought special advantages to them, in
terms of making money in the marketplace (Overholt).
Conversely, in the Soviet Union, Gorbachev’s approach immediately distanced
essentially all important social groups for his reform plan. He continued to ignore the
farmers and placed stronger work demands for less wages on Soviet workers. The
once managerial elite was stripped of its power and advantages, while losing income.
After more than thirty years of alienating the masses, the Communist Party was told
to campaign for election to public office. The Soviet military lost much of its budget
and access to technological advances as their major allies were aligning themselves
with the West. This chaos and overnight reform caused these groups to oppose and
further resist Gorbachev's move to a market economy. The only allies to
Gorbachev's reform plan seemed to be foreigners and intellectuals because he was
instrumental in ending the cold war and freedom of speech had become a reality
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(Overholt).
Most experts on China's reforms and political future focus on the various
personalities of the individual players in the regime and who will outmaneuver whom.
However, some believe that China's future will be determined largely by group
interactions, not by individuals jockeying for position. Currently, all the potential
successors to Deng support the basic tenets of his reform program. Although there is
a wide range of views and some degree of division among Deng's heirs, their concern
is essentially how quickly and to what extent should reform go and not in what
direction (Overholt).

Administration
China's approach to reform has been carefully planned and introduced in
managable phases. However, the former Soviet Union has sporadically and quickly
liberalized prices and privatized business. This sudden liberalization created
enormous inflation and a worthless currency, while overnight privatization created
economic anarchy. Inflation rates in 1991 were around 91 per cent and in 1992
inflation soared to more than 2000 per cent, thus causing a catastrophic collapse in the
ruble. This severe inflation has not only damaged the Soviet Union's infrastructure,
but has discouraged both domestic and foreign investment, destroying the chance for
economic growth (Overholt).
China's strategy has been to liberalize prices slowly over a period of time and
like its neighbors it has been cautious to prevent rice prices from becoming explosive
and endangering its rural population. While liberalizing prices, China created credit
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controls and bond markets to help control and maintain a reasonable level of inflation.
This scheme has allowed speedy growth and with a workable inflation sequence never
exceeding 20% in its major cities and even less in rural areas (Overholt).
Although in the beginning China's strategies to control inflation seemed to
work, in a statement issued during August 1994, China's State Statistical Bureau
(SSB) was quoted as saying, "the ratcheting up of industrial production, market sales,
cash payment by banks and inflation has already put the macroeconomy on the rim of
the 'red light zone' and this merits close attention." The report indicated that China's
consumer price index (the leading inflationary indicator) rose by 25.8% nationwide
and is sending a clear signal that the economy is dangerously close to overheating
(Jia, 1994).
With respect to privatization, China has been especially guarded. Its policy is
to delay privatization until it has resolved several major hurdles. First, China must
successfully liberalize prices so that it does not bankrupt companies. Secondly, a
national pension system must be created to protect its retirees from losing their
pensions. Next, China must provide medical and educational programs for its
enormous population. Also, communist leaders must implement banking reforms to
adjust for private enterprise. In addition, China must develop a working stock market
to assess the efficiency of companies, analyze trends, communicate findings widely
and efficiently and manage stock transactions.
China's policy of gradual privatization has received much criticism, but it has
been key to its overall success. The Soviet Union's spontaneous privatization, while
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praised by many, has caused major industries to fail and discouraged domestic and
foreign investment in the country. China's strategy has promoted huge investments by
foreign and private investors, has served to reduce the population's poverty and
helped finance solutions to China's problems (Overholt).

China's Distinct Advantages
China has other distinct advantages over the Soviet Union. For example,
China enjoys the synergy of being close to other fast-growing and emerging markets,
but more importantly, there exists a network of Chinese businesspeople who no longer
live in China. Living in Indonesia, Malaysia, India, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and
elsewhere, these businesspeople are part of the world's largest tribe and have strong
emotional ties to the motherland (WuDunn & Kristoff, 1994).
Also, China's economy has always been decentralized and distributed widely
throughout the country. The communists centralized political control, but out of fear
of neighboring Japan, the leadership placed manufacturing plants all over the country
so if part of China was lost in war, it would not lose a key manufacturer of strategic
goods to continue the war effort. Stalin, however, divided the Soviet Union into
manufacturing sectors: tanks were made in one place, tractors in another. Whereas
Russia has only a few enormous industrial operations in each manufacturing sector,
China has many small manufacturing plants scattered throughout the country. In
China's shift to a market economy, these thousands of small operations adapted
themselves easily to entrepreneurship and privatization. Russia is plagued with large,
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cumbersome, inefficient facilities.
In addition, China has a huge enterpreneurial advantage. While Chinese
farmers eagerly embraced the opportunity to decide their own economic future and to
make a profit, the Russian farmers openly defied the liberalization of the economy
with great cynicism.
Southeast Asia is filled with ethnic Chinese already running things. Probably
the single most significant factor in China's success is the power and pride of the
Chinese. It has been estimated that there are 55 million Chinese living outside
mainland China. Many of these overseas Chinese are successful businesspeople and
are beginning to migrate back to the motherland to invest and teach others.
As opposed to the Chinese, Russians have no memory or history of
entrepreneurship or free markets and no outside ethnic members to help them create a
market economy ("Why the Chinese are making it", 1993).
China and the Soviet Union clearly used different methods in their move to
capitialism. However, China's regional approach of designating certain rural areas as
"Special Economic Zones" is probably the most unique and has resulted in a much
more efficient transition strategy.

CHAPTER III
CHINA SHIFTS FROM COMMUNISM TO CAPITIALISM
A distinctive feature of China's move towards privatization is its regional
approach. In 1979 China began to practice an odd sort of communism by allowing
some rural areas of China to operate in a capitalistic way, while others remained
locked in the grips of communism. It first opened its coastal areas. With Hong Kong
playing an important role in the regional orientation of this open door policy,
Guangdong and Fujian Provinces were selected as the sites for the location of four
Special Economic Zones (SEZs). The underlying premise for the creation and
existence of the SEZ was to provide a workshop to which employees from state and
municipal corporations all over China would be sent to study Western management
and technology in joint ventures with foreign companies. The goal for these
individuals after having learned these skills in the SEZ, was to return to their
respective provinces and transmit their new expertise to their colleagues and
employees. And as a result, modem methods of management and technology would
gradually filter back into inner China (Dorn & Xi, 1990).
Guangdong, the closest province to Hong Kong, was the first area authorized
to engage in this quasi-communism (by freeing it from state planning and ownership
regulations). In the city of Shenzhen, businesses were allowed to operate, employing
the ideals, philosophy and techniques of a capitalistic and market-based society,
without intervention or interference by the Chinese government. By the early 1990's,
the experiment proved to be highly successful, as Shenzhen has grown at a rate
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exceeding 40% per year and has become a mini-Hong Kong. On a recent trip to
Shenzhen, the author found the skyline filled with skyscrapers and the streets full of
Mercedes and Audis -- factories were mass producing products that would saturate the
US market with clothes, toys and shoes — and local inhabitants were wearing
designer labels and using cellular phones. This boom is also producing its share of
Chinese millionaires. Zhou Jiangning of Wenzhou is typical of China's new
millionaires; last year he made a profit of US $750,000, This would certainly place
him in the upper-bracket in any country in the world (Evans, 1993). Interestingly,
some 80% of the investment in Guangdong came from Hong Kong. And half of
Guangdong's industrial workforce (over three million out of six million) was
employed by Hong Kong companies. Three out of four Hong Kong companies have
operations in China, representing some twenty-three thousand ventures.
For the peasant population of Guangdong, the staggering growth brought an
overnight emersion into consumerism. Once an underemployed population with
virtually no mobility suddenly had plenty of work and unlimited opportunities. By
1990 approximately fifty per cent of Guangdong's rural households had a radio, a
television and a tape recorder (Overholt).

Township and Village Enterprises
Another important factor contributing to and making reformation possible,
especially in the rural areas of China, is a hybrid company that is not really private,
and not state-owned either. This mixture of a private and state-owned firm is known
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as township and village enterprises (TVEs). Although these TVEs are essentially
controlled by units of local government, these companies are inflicting cutthroat
competition to communities once dedicated to socialist precepts. Under basic socialist
principles state-owned enterprises operated employing the following four conditions.
First, goods were made available through administrative allocation, TVEs use the
marketplace. Second, pricing is dictated by government, TVEs allow the supply and
demand to determine prices. Third, state-owned companies operated as monopolies,
TVEs create and grow based on competition and survival of the fittest. And the last
condition under socialist principles forced managers to follow the rules of central
government (Naisbitt, 1994).
In an effort to change ownership and management of state-owned enterprises
and bring about a market-oriented structure, China's State Economic and Trade
Commission is further reducing its administrative interference. It also plans to form a
shareholding system and independent management system for all state-owned
companies.
In contrast to state-owned enterprises, TVEs function in accordance with the
rules of the marketplace. Managers of TVEs answer to local officials and to the
householders who either started or invested in the enterprise. In many areas of China,
these TVEs are simply superficially disguised private companies, in other areas, they
are owned by local governments. In any event, private or government owned, they
keep a close eye on the bottom line and profiitability. It is estimated that there are
currently 20 million such ventures throughout China.
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These TVEs are contributing substantially to a local area's economy, including
roads, schools, and hosptials. So local governments are forcing managers to act like
businesspeople, not bureaucrats. Bankruptcies, virtually unknown during the
Communist regime, are now a fact of life for badly managed TVEs. During 1989,
losses of state-owned companies reached enormous levels, but none went bankrupt.
But at the same time 3 million TVEs went under or were absorbed by other TVEs
(Naisbitt).
The typical rural Chinese attitude toward central authority, fueled by strong
profit/money motives, has dramatically changed since the days of communism. They
recognize that the central government has limited resources, is located far away, and
the huge numbers of people and business units are far too large to regulate.
Additionally, these enterprises have no enacted laws or regulations to govern
their activities, so local governments and private owners are making up the rules as
needed. And, should the TVEs not agree with new rules or laws set forth by Beijing,
they simply ignore them or develop a creative way to circumvent them.
Not only are TVEs competing with one another, but through exporting, they
are competing with companies around the globe. Experts believe that more that
seventy percent of China's industrial output comes from these TVEs, with only a
meager ten percent being contributed by the state-owned firms. These TVEs continue
to pop up all over China and clearly have become instrumental in China's continued
growth and transition to a market economy (Naisbitt).

19
Unemployment
Although the dynamism of China's economy is visibly improving living
standards virtually everywhere in the country, China's unemployment rate continues to
be a serious problem. Officially, the government has announced that it is currently a
little over 2 per cent, but recent reports (not substantiated) place unemployment at
about 200 million people, or about 30 per cent of the workforce (Overholt).
Generally, the unemployment problem is conceived in terms of the loss of jobs
created by reform or by businesses closing as a result of foreign competition. This is
not the problem. The problem is that the system of socialism and protectionism
almost guarantees the proliferation of huge firms and bureaucracies which are not
serving market needs and are therefore not providing jobs for their employees. As a
result, there is a buildup of disguised unemployment. Each company essentially
becomes a small welfare system, whose size and costs grow until they eventually
collapse the firm and the country.
Certainly reform creates millions of new jobs, as the industries that emerge as
a result are job-intensive. Making shirts, toys, shoes and cameras requires lots of
workers. But reform has removed the cover that has disguised unemployment. The
paradox: most of the jobs generating China's US $80 billion of exports are new jobs,
but at the same time unemployment has become a source of heightened concern.
This invisible unemployment is becoming more visible as millions of people
move from one area to another seeking employment. Not only does this
unemployment become more and more apparent, but also changes occur more rapidly
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and more disruptively. These accelerated shifts in employment and unemployment are
politically more dangerous (Overholt).
As more and more enterprises close, more and more people will find it easy to
organize, potentially becoming a threat to the government and slowing reforms. The
government's objective must be to keep the economy growing fast enough to keep the
job creation rate high, implement reform in phases, to spread the pain geographically,
and to explain the process so that discontent does not reach critical proportions of
mass anger and organization. In a country as large as China, this could become a
hugh problem if appropriate actions are not taken.
Although many things have improved since economic reform began,
unfortunately the country's infrastructure is not one of them. For instance, China
lacks an adequate telephone network, a coast-to-coast highway system, suitable
transportation sources, and enough utility installations to deal with the ever-growing
market. However, infrastructure weaknesses, as opposed to inflation and enterprise
problems, are results of a country's success. Most observers believe that China's
phenomenal growth will most certainly produce the capital required to pay for new
infrastructures (Overholt).
China's efforts to privatize state-owned enterprises and the growth of its TVEs
have certainly played an important role in economic reforms. However, the most
interesting event, and vital to economic reform, was the reopening of its stock market
system. China shocked the world by becoming the first Communist country with
stock exchanges — two of them, located in Shanghai and Shenzhen. The next chapter

analyzes China's stock markets and their impact.

CHAPTER IV
CHINA'S STOCK M ARKETS
Over the past decade, China has experienced rapid economic growth
characterized by economic reforms and an "open door" policy. In the coming decade,
China's main goal is to complete the second stage of its modernization, that is, to
quadruple the GDP of 1980 by the year 2000 and raise the Chinese people's standard
of living to a level which is described as "comfortable" in the West. The goal has
been to develop socialism with Chinese characteristics through economic reform. But
the ultimate question plaguing the world remains: To what extent will the leadership,
which plans to maintain the socialist path, continue with this economic overhaul? But
one good sign is their tolerance of the existence of a stock market, which is the
paramount symbol of capitalism because it allows individuals the opportunity to invest
and own shares of Chinese companies (Yebi, 1993).
Despite a long list of technical and ideological barriers — in late 1990 the
government began experimenting with a stock market, first in Shanghai, then in
Shenzhen. Because China was considered the eighth largest economy in the world,
this experiment was of vital importance to its future development and the world.
Securities and stock markets are not new to China. China's first stock
exchange was established in Shanghai in the 1890s and ten years later an active bond
market was set up in Beijing. At the time living standards were generally low and
shares were too expensive relative to income. Because of this, most investors came
from the upper-middle class. Not only were these people more knowledgeable about
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securities than their poorer counterparts, they also had the capital to speculate (Yebi).
By 1948, hyperinflation hit Shanghai. The subsequent reaction suspended the
operations of both the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Chinese M erchant's Stock
Exchange even before the Communists took over in 1949. However, in 1949 when
communism was the central theme of the new government, stock exchanges were
viewed as the most prominent symbol of an oppressive capitalistic society and were
banned (Yebi).
In 1986, the first securities trading market surfaced. However, public
response was weak.

Goal of the Stock Market
While China continues its economic reform and "open door" policies, it must
be remembered that the general direction of change is socialistic and this must be kept
in mind in order to assess developments in the Chinese stock market. The ultimate
purpose of the stock market is not to privatize state-owned firms and change their
fundamental nature, but rather to reduce the government's budget deficits by
improving their efficiency and cost-effectiveness. This will also reduce their
dependence on state subsidies and loans. Also, without government involvement,
public companies will have the freedom to generate the necessary funds for expansion
without limitations or restrictions on amount or use of funds. The stock market is
also an effective way to convert private savings into capital investment.
Low productivity and efficiency have been the mainstay of China's state-owned
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businesses, because the responsibility of making a profit was not placed on any one
person. Upon issuing public stock, these enterprises now have both a legal and
financial responsibility to the shareholders (Yebi).
Although China's leader, Deng Xiaoping continues to support change, the
official attitude of China remains socialist and any change in the future must be
viewed in the context of the prevailing socialistic system. So, the problem facing
China's leadership is how to successfully integrate a Westernized stock market which means adopting capitalism - into a socialist system.
In the near term, potential problems are not apparent because the number of
state-owned companies currently outnumber the companies listed on the stock
exchange, with 155 state-owned to 28 private firms. And for those players in the
market, the government retains a predetermined number of shares, making stateowned enterprises the dominant factor (Yebi).

Current and Future Sites
Continuing enthusiasm for economic reform and a change in national attitude is
evidenced by the reopening of the Shanghai stock exchange, the opening of a second
in Shenzhen and a third in Beijing. Guangzhou, the Capital of Guangdong Province,
recently requested permission to launch a stock exchange and may soon receive
approval ("A new day"). In addition to Guangzhou, the provinces or cities of Beijing,
.Tianjin, Wuhan, Shenyang, Xiamen, Hainan and Shandong have all expressed a desire
to establish a stock exchange. Each site has distinct advantages. For example,
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Beijing has strong political and financial foundations with a technically trained work
force. Tianjin is a popular commercial and cultural center and had its own stock
exchange before 1949. Shenyang is home to China's largest state enterprises.
Guangzhou had over 100 renminbi (RMB) million in stocks in circulation in 1982.
Hainan has an internal stock exchange center and China's largest free trade zone.
Xiamen is backed up by Taiwanese capital and investors. Wuhan is the proposed site
for the Central China Free Trade Zone. And Shandong is an open coastal city with a
large amount of Japanese capital invested.
China's leaders are reluctant to expand the stock markets too quickly and want
to learn from Shanghai and Shenzhen before opening additional locations. In the
meantime, Vice Premier Zhu Rouggi is encouraging other provinces with strong
economic records to list their stocks in Shanghai or Shenzhen thereby developing them
as regional stock centers (Yebi).
At the Shenzhen exchange, would-be investors crowd around a storefront video
monitor displaying the day's stock prices or stand in line along a sidewalk and wait
their turn to place an order for stock and invest in such companies as China Bicycles
and Shenzhen Konka, China's largest color-TV manufacturer (Cook, 1992).
The action on the exchange itself, some 15 floors up, stands in stark
contrast to the carnival below: 33 clerks sit calmly at computer terminals, punching in
buy and sell orders. In August 1992, a total of 26 securities were trading on the
exchange and volume was averaging about 10 million shares a day (versus 200 million
shares on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)). However, unlike the NYSE, there

26
are no floor brokers, no specialists and no discarded order slips. And it is not
uncommon for a particular stock to rise or fall 20% in a given day (compared to
NYSE where a rise or fall would average 2-4%) (Cook).
Public interest in China's stockmarkets has spread beyond just the Shenzhen
and Shanghai exchanges to cities such as Changsha, the capital of Hunan province.
Every week thousands of new investors are purchasing stocks with the number of
investors living outside Shenzhen and Shanghai now greater than the number living
inside. Because of the superior returns on China's stocks, many ordinary Chinese
citizens are electing to invest their considerable savings in the stock market (Mooney,
1993).

Types of Shares
There are other differences between the Chinese stock exchange and Western
exchanges. For example, there are two stock exchanges: in Shanghai and in
Shenzhen. At first, this may not seem particularly unusual; after all, the US has
several regional stock-market exchanges besides the NYSE and the American
Exchange on Wall Street. But the difference in China is that the two exchanges are
not linked. They are separate. Also, there are two classes of shares in China, A and
B shares. The A shares - which are considered the most promising and profitable
stocks - are being reserved only for Chinese investors. Since foreigners are not
permitted to buy A shares very little is known about them and how they are traded.
The B share is exclusively reserved for foreigners and is the vehicle used to introduce
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foreign investment into China through the stock market.
According to the rules governing the issuing and trading of B shares published
by the Chinese authorities, B shares are RMB-denominated and registered, and
exclusively for overseas investors, including; foreign, legal and natural persons; legal
and natural persons in Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan; and other persons approved
by the authority in charge.
Companies issuing B shares are required to have a steady and adequate source
o f foreign currency, and such currency should be sufficient to fund at least the
payment of the final dividend on B shares every year.
All trading of B shares must be carried out in either the Shanghai Securities
Exchange or the Shenzhen Stock Exchange and may only be traded among those
persons who were authorized to purchase them originally.
The Beijing government permitted a few companies to issue B shares up to 49
per cent of their total issued capital. In Shanghai, the Shanghai Vacuum Electronic
Device Company — the biggest counter on the local stock exchange — issued a total of
one million new B shares to the public (about one-third of the expansion capital).
These B shares were jointly underwritten by Swiss Bank Corporation, Sun Hung Kai
& Co., and Soloman Brothers, with the investors coming mainly from Hong Kong.
The issuing price was RMB 420, representing a discount of approximately 40 per cent
to the share's average price of RMB 700 in the "A" shares market, i.e., the normal
market (Yebi).
At the same time, two companies in Shenzhen went public by issuing new
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shares to investors (part of which were B shares). These companies were; China
Southern Glass a Sino-Hong Kong joint venture principally engaged in producing glass
products, and Shenzhen Property Development Company, a leading property
developer in Shenzhen. The B's, unlike the A stocks, must meet tougher accounting
standards for listing.
As previously mentioned, the B shares are denominated in Chinese currency,
but are issued and traded in foreign currencies based on the exchange rates in China's
foreign exchange swap centers. All trading is conducted on the local stock exchanges,
however a separate market is being formed because the foreign contingent is
essentially a different group of investors (Yebi).
Further evidence of China's economic prosperity is reflected in the growth of
stock prices. During the first forty-five days of 1993, the price of China "B" shares
had risen by 49%, (based on figures provided by Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia).
The price of "A" shares had risen by more than 67%. Compare that to China's
neighboring countries, such as Taiwan where prices (in approximately the same length
of time) have risen only a meager 19%, and have fallen in Malaysia and South Korea
("Taming the tiger", 1993).
These increases have left China markets looking very expensive to the average
investor with regard to earnings per share to cost per share. The "B" shares in
Shanghai are selling at an average of 17 times earnings per share. In Shenzhen shares
are selling at roughly 26 times earnings (calculated by dividing the market price per
share of stock by its earnings per share). That compares with 11 times earnings in
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Hong Kong and 12 in the U.S markets ("Taming the tiger").
The B shares have attracted the attention of international investors, such as
foreign trust funds. Several Hong Kong, Taiwan and other international funds have
established trust funds to invest in B shares. These trust funds not only invest in
China's stock markets but also in potential firms in China. This is done because
under Chinese tax regulations, any company with 25% of its shares held by foreigners
is allowed tax concessions for joint ventures. That is, their company's applicable tax
rate will decrease from 50% to 33%. As a result, many Chinese companies are eager
to issue B shares to lure international investors (Yebi).
Generally, investing in any stock market is risky, however, investing in
Chinese B shares not only bear the usual hazards, but some additional ones as well.
For example, political shifts could place the stock markets in jeopardy, or a reversal
or changes in policy could cause fluctuations in stock value. Additionally, by trading
in renminbi, when RMB depreciates or increases, investors will either suffer or
benefit (Yebi).
There is a danger that inflation will continue to dramatically affect China's
seemingly unstoppable economy. Real output rose by 12.8% last year and trouble
may be as very close. Foreign investors are particularly concerned because local
currency declined 10% against the dollar in 1993. This decline has caused paper
losses related to exchange rate fluctuations ("Taming the tiger").
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Difficulties Encountered
The opening of these stockmarkets has not been without difficulties. Rioting
broke out in Shenzhen on August 8, 1992, when 1 million people from all over China
poured into the city (usual population 2 million) to stand in line for an application to
purchase shares of stock. For the next three days "would-be shareholders" smashed
windows and cars and attacked each other and the police. Many people were injured,
and some reports indicated that several were killed. On August 11th, the stock
exchange was closed for the afternoon, and China's cabinet met in Beijing to discuss
what should be done to prevent further incidents. The only comfort for China's
leadership was that the worst disturbance since Tiananmen Square had nothing to do
with politics, the motive was money ("Open outcry", 1992).
The main question troubling authorities was how to distribute shares when the
demand far outweighed the supply available. To help alleviate the problem, officials
set up a lottery system to allocate 500 million yuan (Chinese currency) worth of new
shares that were expected to be issued.
The government printed 5 million lottery forms available at 100 yuan apiece.
Each purchaser was allowed to purchase up to 10 forms each, on a first come first
serve basis. The lucky winners were entitled to buy up to 1000 shares per form in 14
companies offering shares on the market.
Although this lottery system worked well, demand by Chinese citizens for
shares was so great that even worthless photocopies of stock certificates were bought
and sold on the streets to unsuspecting customers ("Open outcry").
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Although since their reopening, China's stock markets have experienced
phenomenal growth, many financial experts caution investors. They say the big risk
is that any correction in the Chinese economy will dramatically affect stocks and will
probably last a long time. Seems investors are beginning to share that word of
caution. According to Credit Lyonnais All China index, both the Shanghai and
Shenzhen exchanges by August 1993 lost over 50% of their value since peaking in
February 1993. The reason for this decline is because most stocks when initially
offered are overpriced. For example, Brillance China's stock nearly doubled after its
initial offering before declining to near its list price. But at $19, it still sold for 17
times the 1994 earnings estimate of $1.10 a share projected by Bryan Sudweeks
manager of Montgomery Emerging Markets fund in San Francisco. Another example
is China Tire. The company’s initial price of $17 settled down to $13, but thatisstill
15 times the 1994 estimate of its earnings.

Sudweeks feels these stocks should sell at

multiples closer to seven or eight, or $7 a share for China Tire and $9 for Brillance
China (Neumeier, 1993).
Because of the volatility of China's stock markets, experts recommend that a
less risky approach might be to invest in the three funds listed on the NYSE: the
China Fund, the Jardine Fleming China Region fund and the Greater China fund
(Neumeier).
Aside from the risk of inflation, overpriced stocks and declining exchange
rates, foreign investors can be assured that the chances of insider trading and other
abuses of the stock market, will greatly diminish due to the formation of a Securities
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Commission to oversee the Chinese stock exchange and its activities. Although no
problems have yet emerged, this monitoring body will coordinate the control and
regulation of stock markets, and it requires that all state-owned businesses adopt
international accounting standards. These firms are now required to use balance
sheets, income statements and cash-flow statements in the operation of their business
("Taming the tiger"). This does not guarantee everything will be squeaky clean, any
more than the US Securities and Exchange Commission can on Wall Street, but at
least some of the worst abuses will be prevented.

Stock Market Stalls
Although China's stock market started as a raging bull, it began to demonstrate
signs of weakness by mid-1994. For instance, the market for the "A" shares, which
only mainland Chinese may buy, fell by almost two-thirds by May 1994. In addition,
the price to earnings ratio that leaped above 100 in 1993, has since fallen, on average,
to 30. Although by Western standards this is still incredibly strong, in China this is
considered weak. This situation caused a postponement of $630 million worth of new
stock issues to be released in late 1994.
In the meantime, foreign investors moved their money to those Chinese
companies listed in Hong Kong (with eight mainland listings) and New York (with
three) ("Bears in a China shop", 1994).
By July 1994, trading on China's stock markets slowed severely with stock
prices falling sharply to record lows. The decline was attributed to lower company
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profits that resulted from restrictions on bank loans and the government's drive against
inflation. Worried investors then decided to invest their funds in bank deposits and
government bonds (Kahn, 1994).
However, after several months of dormancy, China's stock markets began to
rally. By August 1994, the trading volume on the Shanghai Exchange broke records.
Both the "A" and "B" shares increased which led observers to speculate that another
sharp correction was on the horizon. But the rally continued. To further boost
confidence, the China Securities Regulatory Commission made an announcement that
they were considering the possibility of allowing foreign investors into the "A" share
market for the first time (Kahn).
Observers are recognizing that the rise and fall of China's stock market is a
direct result of government intervention in the volume of stocks it will allow to be
traded. As a result, poor quality stocks rise in price simply because they are in short
supply. These kinds of manipulations are contrary to the forces that drive a stock
market and are raising serious concerns over the long-term prosperity of China's stock
exchanges (Kaye, 1994)
It is apparent that the market does not function like Western stock markets.
It is not driven by fundamentals or by logical operations based on price-eamings ratios
or earnings per share. Some experts have compared China's stock market to a
racetrack where investors demonstrate "casino-like madness" and act more like
gamblers playing craps than serious, knowledgeable investors. But carnival
atomosphere or not, it is difficult to argue with success. Since the stock markets birth
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in December 1990, capitalization has topped US $28.9 billion and some experts
believe that the Shanghai Exchange will become one of the top 10 stocks markets in
the world by the year 2000 (Shale, 1994a).
This attitude is further supported by seven key experts in Chinese finance.
China International Trust and Investment Corporation's Chang Zhenming feels that
there will be a sharp increase in the number of Chinese firms seeking overseas listings
because they desperately need foreign capital. Liu Bo, vice president of the Shanghai
Exchange agrees with this observation, but also believes that Shanghai will eventually
become the center o f all Chinese listings. Ian Boyce, of Schroders Asia, is also
convinced that the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges will continue their pattern of
growth. He also envisions new stock markets in Beijing, Tienjin and Harbin. And
finally, In-Hong Chung of China Enterprise Investment Management suggests that the
Shanghai exchange will ultimately become an international financial center much like
Hong Kong and Singapore (Shale, 1994b).

Long-Range Challenges
As these stock markets continue to develop and expand, observers feel stateowned companies will become a minority and those public companies partially
controlled by the government will continue issuing more stock thereby diluting the
government's percentage of ownership. The end result will be that private ownership
will be the dominant form of ownership. Other than a repeat of recent crashes in the
stock market, the basic problems confronting China in further developing their stock
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market are ideological, macro-economic and environmental, legal and simply
understanding the mechanics of a stock market system.
Ideological Issues
From the beginning of the reform movement, the Chinese leadership was
plagued by several highly academic and intellectual questions concerning a stock
market. For instance, will a capitalist market actually change state-owned enterprises?
Another concern is whether the existence of shareholders will accelerate China's
privatization efforts? Also, are stockholders exploiting the workers because they share
in the company's profits while the workers do not? The answers to these questions
are still undecided and as a result, China's leadership continues to take a very
tentative attitude towards the development of stock markets (Yebi).
Typically, stock markets are viewed as secondary markets and therefore, no
real wealth is created. However, supporters contend that a stock market helps channel
savings and risk capital into viable, productive businesses. Opponents argue that the
high turnover rate is more consistent with speculation than with the idea of long-term
investments. Others believe that betting in a casino or racetrack is a better way to
shift wealth. The real truth lies somewhere between these ideals.
The stock market is a tool, and like most tools has no ideology, though it
functions better in some environments than in others. It can also be an excellent
device to reallocate capital because investors are driven by speculation and greed.
Developing a stock market in China is consistent with the goals of the Chinese
leadership. The stock market could be the mechanism, the means by which state
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ownership can be smoothly transferred to the people. However, to prevent the loss of
the factors of production (buildings, land, machinery, tools etc) the government could
simply lease the right to operate a business for a specified period of time. Also, in
order to limit the public control over these enterprises, no more than 50 per cent of
the voting share would be available for purchase (Yebi).
China's economic foundations are built predominately on state-owned
companies and these companies have real financial power and investment potential.
Introducing a stock market system will force these enterprises to be privatized, which
is contradictory to socialist thinking. However, arguments that support a stock
market, contend that such a mechanism will provide an alternate source of capital for
enterprises in the economy (Yebi).
Macro-Economic and Environmental Problems
Even though China's economic reforms are showing signs of success, there are
still problems that need to be resolved. Officials need to improve and expand the
mobilization and allocation of domestic financial resources. Government involvement
is still a major factor. The central government continues to use its influence to
manipulate local, provincial and central officials, as well as through taxes, import
allocations, pricing decisions and designating managers. But even with these
problems, many of the macro-economic factors generally considered harmful in the
development of a securities market, do not exist.
The continuing existence of barriers to competition and the perpetuation of the
government-controlled financial resources allocation system, is a crucial problem.
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Price controls continue to distort market mechanisms and the tax system is used as a
way to correct deviations on an as needed basis. Price reforms need to be predicated
on pressures due to inflation. Bankruptcy is yet another problem since Chinese law
does not currently recognize the concept even though some TVEs have closed their
doors claiming insolvency, in essence bankruptcy. Another issue is whether
enterprises will be financially capable of assuming the burden of social overhead and
worker welfare.
Interest rates usually play an important role in allocating resources and
mobilizing savings. However, thus far, interest rates (which are set by the central
bank) have not been a factor. One major problem is the low rate paid on enterprise
time deposits and on treasury bonds held by enterprises (about 5 per cent). As a
result, enterprises are using available capital for internal investment or inventory
accumulation rather than savings (Yebi).
Legal Structure Problems
In order for an economic system to succeed, it must have a stable legal
structure with limited government involvement. The absence of this would cause
extreme uncertainty and fear in the market.
Unfortunately, to date, there is not a clearly defined national framework of
laws, rules or regulations to govern a stock market in China. The listing requirements
are unclear and enterprise asset valuations are even more vague.
Aside from regulations, rules and definable laws, China does not use an
internationally recognized accounting method. Basically, Chinese companies use a
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national accounting system, by which the nation is one big company and the profit or
loss of an individual business is the nation's gain or loss, therefore, the importance of
a single business is insignificant. Coupled with the lack of accounting procedures is
the lack of an acceptable auditing system. Both of these problems will make it
virtually impossible for foreign investors to have any degree of confidence in the
declared financial position of any business.
The absence of a cohesive accounting system also complicates how an
enterprise computes it profits. For instance, in Shenzhen, independent companies are
not obligated to sell their hard currency to the state. Therefore, if they enter their
income according to existing rules (converting currency at current rates) they will
show an operational loss on paper. However, if they use swap center rates, a
potential profit may be entered. And if a black market rate is used, they may show a
considerable profit. While the latter two methods are sometimes used, they are not
considered legal in China. How public companies are to handle this issue is not yet
clear. Since there is not a proper method of accounting and auditing, a company will
very often undervalue its assets to issue shares to employees at a discounted value
(Yebi).
Understanding the Mechanics of a Stock Market
A sound, stable stock market is based on the public having a clear perception
of how it works and exactly what it is. The Chinese investor's understanding of a
stock market and investing in a company's shares is at best vague. Typically, an
investor will direct his attention to the potential dividends of a stock rather than its
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long-term appreciation and value. Recognizing this, companies have offered excessive
dividend rates to shareholders which most of these companies cannot afford. As a
result, many of the companies that went public quickly realized that the interest paid
on stocks was about three times higher than local banks were offering. In the future,
this situation may prevent potential public companies from engaging in this expensive
way of raising capital.
Obtaining detailed information on China's stock market is extremely difficult as
listed companies have no obligation to provide any significant data. Their only
obligation is to hold a yearly stockholder meeting and to disclose a profit and loss
statement.
Another gap in China's stock market is the lack of a sufficient number of listed
companies, independent jobbers and underwriters. And a key ingredient in the
success of any venture is qualified, trained personnel. China currently has very few
knowledgeable brokers and no official training program (Yebi).
With a changing attitude and obvious movement toward capitalism, China has
been phenomenally successful at attracting foreign investors as they are eager to get
into the Chinese market. Although precise figures are unavailable, it appears that in
1992, foreigners and Chinese invested as much as US $11 billion in China and signed
agreements that pledged an additional US $55.5 billion over the life of the
agreements. Contrary to popular belief, these funds are not just coming from
America, most of the money is coming from China's neighbors such as Taiwan, South
Korea, Japan and Hong Kong (Evans).
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Yet it is still unclear just how far the Chinese government is willing to go to
embrace capitalism. Deng Xiaoping, China's leader, who led this new wave of
economic reforms, has said bold experiments should be initiated to develop the stock
markets. But he also warns that the stock markets could be closed if something goes
wrong. No one is quite sure exactly what that statement means ("Taming the tiger").
However, things did go very wrong in 1994 when the stock market crashed, but it
seems that wasn't serious enough in Deng's opinion to close the stock markets.
However, reformists maintain that developing a securities market is the best
way to raise much needed capital, and probably the only way for ailing state industries
to become accountable to shareholders and more productive. Government statistics
illustrate that more that two-thirds of state-owned businesses are losing money and
require subsidies.
Conservatives fear that allowing the public and foreigners to purchase shares
will crack the very roots of socialism — state ownership -- and further weaken the
Communist Party's control of the economy. In that, they are right. It is an ongoing
clash between economic prosperity and political control ("Taming the tiger").
But equally important to China's economic success and shift to a market-based
system is the need to restructure its financial markets. This development is vitally
important to China's economic reforms and responds to the central problems facing
the country.

CHAPTER V
DEVELOPMENT OF OTHER FINANCIAL MARKETS
The development of China's financial markets was in response to specific
problems and the needs of the economy rather than some ideological plan.

The

debate over development of the financial markets brings all the central ideological
struggles together: command vs. market, central control vs. efficiency, state
ownership vs. private ownership, egalitarianism vs. growth, and party control vs.
government control. China's expansion of its financial markets will be one of the
dominant trends of the 1990's and its success or failure will be determined by whether
these mechanisms of capitalism can be used to shape future socialist reforms
(Overholt).

Bond Market
The government's broad strategy of reform permitted and encouraged extensive
local initiative, many times approving plans that clearly contradicted central directives.
They let institutions like the bond market develop without direction or interference and
stepped in only when they felt they understood the needs of the economy and the
options for regulation.
The Chinese government began issuing bonds in 1981 and volume increased to
more than RMB 54 million by 1989. In the beginning, bonds had long maturities and
low interest rates, but by the 1980's a new market was forming and interest rates
began to move in response to market forces. Ten-year bonds gave way to three and
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five-year maturities and interest rates reacted to inflation and increased from 8 to 14
percent by 1988. By the end of the decade, the government was issuing treasury
bonds, government bonds, special project bonds and value-guaranteed bonds with
interest rates indexed to inflation.
Although selling bonds posed no ideological problems for the state, investors
needed to trade them at prices that reflected market conditions as well as their face
value. In a capitalist market, the principal value of bonds fall when interest rates rise
and the opposite when interest rates fall. To meet investor needs, the state permitted
the creation of secondary market trading, initially in seven cities, eventually expanding
to fifty-four. Trading was limited to government bonds, negotiable certificates of
deposit and other instruments approved by the state bank. In addition, trading could
only be handled by securities companies, trust and investment companies, and others
specifically approved by the government (Overholt).
In the mid 1980's, tight government controls on sources of capital to
enterprises, forced many companies to issue their own bonds to the public. These
"enterprise bonds" as they became known, created some profound problems. The
Chinese population confused bonds with shares. And because the government had not
sanctioned or factored this new bond into its overall plan, officials felt the instrument
undermined the state plan. Responding to potential problems with these enterprise
bonds, the state eventually implemented the Temporary Regulation of Enterprise
Shares and Bonds plan designed to regulate and control issuance of securities
(Overholt).
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As the bond market continues to develop and expand, new methods to
legitimize them have emerged. For example, initially the government determined the
credit worthiness of a firm by simply requiring it to show that the total value of its
bonds does not exceed its asset value. However, in Shanghai and Guangdong, a new
credit rating system uses third party assessments to verify a firm's financial strength
and assure investors of its solvency (Overholt).
As the bond market became more and more regulated, it also served to give it
a certain degree of legitimacy and thereby created national bond markets. Although
the bonds are trading with relative freedom, the government continues to overregulate
the market by prohibiting bonds that exceed the state's interest rate, bonds that finance
fixed assets not defined in the national plan and trading that would result in a yield of
more than 15 percent (Overholt).
In the period 1989-90, the government once again recognized the importance
of the bond market when inflation and credit had to be tightly regulated. During this
period, the government issued new instruments. Commercial institutions that issued
bonds to the public now expanded into three kinds of state enterprise bonds, bank
financial bonds, negotiable certificates of deposit, and enterprise bonds with short,
medium and long maturities. Additionally, some private companies elected to issue
these enterprise bonds to their employees instead of paying them wages (Overholt).
Over the nine year period of 1981-90, the Chinese government issued more
than RMB 100 billion in securities. Of those securities, stocks represented only 4
percent.
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While bond growth continued to increase, the government began to improve
and update its bond issuing mechanisms. During the 1980's it was customary for the
government to forcibly impose the purchase of bonds on workers by simply deducting
it from their pay, commonly known as "administrative floatation". This tactic created
bitterness and resentment among the public toward the central government (Overholt).
Recognizing this hostility, the state devised a new method of selling bonds by
utilizing securities firms as underwriters. Each firm was given an allocation and
committed to sell a specific quantity of bonds and to purchase any amount not sold.
This new system prevented public resentment and absorbed public capital that would
have potentially ended up being spent on consumer goods and causing serious
inflation. To motivate these securities firms and the public, the government set
interest rates very high, thereby, creating a serious demand for bonds. The demand
became so enormous that Beijing eventually began allocating bonds by auction, with
the price being established by the resulting market. However, during 1992-93 the
system temporarily fell apart due to a wave of inflation that was higher than the
interest rate being paid on bonds.
... During this period, in order to reduce the possibility of future problems in
raising foreign capital, the government began issuing US dollar and Hong Kong dollar
bonds. This action raised foreign currency from its own population as well as from
foreigners. This move also resulted in China's debts to be rated by Western standards
and a listing in Standard and Poor's directory (Overholt).
China's transition to financing investments using bank loans rather than state
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grants, and the formation of the securities markets, gave clear indications that inflation
could be controlled by managing the money supply instead of pricing regulation.
China realized that controlling inflation was possible if the money supply could be
regulated through a bond market. Officials theorized that bonds would attract the
excess money that would typically feed inflation. During the 1988-89 period of
severe inflationary rates, China was able to control inflation by using the bond
market, by imposing strict regulations on bonds, and by using high interest rates. As
a result, Beijing is recognized as having one of the world's most modern computerized
bond-trading systems (Overholt).
Again it must be kept in mind that China's securities market is developing
under the prerequisites of public ownership and adherence to socialist orientation. It
is therefore a product of a planned economy at the primary stage of socialism.
In China, the principal floaters, or issuers of bonds, are the central
government, the state banks and the state-owned enterprises. Shareholders are
individuals and state-owned organizations. The share-holding system as practiced in
Chinese enterprises is principally based on public ownership, with the government and
state-owned enterprises holding the majority of the shares. In this way, the nature of
Chinese enterprises has not been changed radically by the issuing of shares. The
situation whereby a few financial institutions can monopolize the market is not likely
to appear.
The State Planning Commission has developed a plan that covers the issuance
of all State Treasury Bonds, bank bonds, corporate bonds and corporate equities in
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China. The plan is viewed as a macro-economic device that controls and oversees the
issuance of all securities by the government. Under the Ministry of Finance falls the
responsibility of organizing State Treasury Bonds, however, it is based on a proposal
approved by the State Planning Commission. Bank bonds and corporate equities are
handled by the People's Bank of China, but once again under a scheme developed by
the State Planning Commission. Unlike the West, where the issuing of bonds and
transferring of stocks and bonds are dictated by the market, all bonds in China must
be issued for the proposed investment only.
The central government has very clear objectives in issuing securities. In
order to balance investments in different industries, securities will be divided among
several. For instance, State Treasury Bonds are primarily issued for general finance,
while construction bonds are intended for raising capital for energy projects,
transportation, raw materials and other infrastructural industries. And bank bonds are
mainly used to generate more working capital for state-owned enterprises, while
corporate bonds are sold by issuing firms to finance or expand technology (Overholt).
The central bank's role, The People's Bank of China, is in the development of
the securities market, i.e., the actual issuing and trading of securities. In the West,
central banks regulate and control public finances mainly through trading state bonds
in the market, with the administration and supervision of securities markets being
normally undertaken by special regulatory commissions or agencies. Currently,
everything in the Chinese securities markets is under the unified control of the central
bank. The reason for this is that the country has been in need of capital for quite
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awhile and the single control by the central bank is conducive to both preventing local
governments and enterprises from blindly expanding the scale of their investments,
and to a more effective control of the money supply (Yebi).

Foreign Exchange
The foreign exchange markets of China are also evolving from a highly
controlled, artificially priced system in the direction of a modem, national, marketpriced system. Early foreign exchange transactions focused on the import of
technology and capital equipment in return for commodity exports -- artificial, wildly
overvalued RMB was viewed as useful for making imports cheap. If exports were
over stimulated, the control system could be used to block them.
Also, foreign investment consisted mostly of joint ventures; the artificially high
RMB overvalued the partner’s contribution and thereby seemed to give China the
better deal. With the few exceptions for high technology, infrastructure and other
high-priority projects, all joint ventures have been required to balance their foreign
exchange earning by exporting enough to pay for their imports of raw materials and
technology.
By the end of 1992, foreign debt had grown to more the US $69 billion. In
order to keep this debt under control, China knew it needed to encourage exports and
discourage imports. However, the overvalued RMB did just the opposite. China's
control on imports caused lengthy delays on needed imports and caused vast
corruption and trade conflicts with Western countries (Overholt).
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Learning again from Asian neighbors, China discovered that to encourage
development, a country must promote exports and discourage imports through a
cheaper currency. And as a result, China devalued the RMB by 20 percent several
times, each time moving it closer and closer to the market rate. Thereafter, it used a
system of mini-devaluations crafted to adjust the currency to the market rate.
Due to China's success in exporting, it began accumulating large foreign
reserves. The ensuing demand for imports raised the demand for foreign currency
and devalued the RMB. While this was happening the Chinese people discovered that
they could gain access to foreign currencies and began to hoard them in large
amounts, causing the value of the RMB to fall dramatically, which caught the
government by complete surprise.
Facing an apparent scarcity of foreign exchange, China sought to make more
efficient use of its current foreign exchange. It began by allowing enterprises to
retain a percentage of their own foreign exchange earnings instead of turning them all
over to the government. To facilitate this program, the government introduced small
foreign exchange markets that were essentially free to find their own levels. These
exchange markets became known as "foreign adjustment centers", or swap centers for
short, these markets allowed ventures with surplus foreign exchange to trade with
ventures that needed additional foreign exchange - at whatever rate the parties
deemed acceptable. Although the rate of exchange was a market rate, the trades
occurred under government scrutiny, the acquisition of funds was restricted to
enterprises needing them for high-priority projects, and the selling of foreign exchange
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was restricted to US dollars acquired through legal retention by enterprises.
However, the government does not allow its banks to engage in this type of trade
(Overholt).

Futures
In October 1990, China, with the technical support of the Chicago Board of
Trade, opened a futures market for wheat in Zhengzhou. Based on its success, China
opened futures markets in Wuhan, Anhui, Jiangxi for rice, in Changchun for corn and
in Shandong for peanuts and peanut oil. The goals of the markets were to give
farmers a hedge against future price changes, prevent the farmer from selling low to
merchants who would in turn sell high at a future opportune date, to help reduce
seasonal price fluctuations and assist the government in making advance decisions
based on clear signals from the marketplace (Overholt).
The futures market that is not being addressed by the government, however, is
currency.

In 1992, China's trade exceeded US $165 billion and due to fluctuations in

currency, the traders faced enormous risks. Foreign banks have attempted to establish
a futures market for China's currency, but Chinese law prohibits foreign banks from
trading in RMB. However, Chinese banks have conducted experiments regarding a
futures market for currency, but so far have not been successful. In an effort to solve
this dilemma, some trading companies have put together small scale markets by
matching importers with exporters. But to date, no true currency forward or futures
market exists for Chinese currency (Overholt).
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Whether China can continue to surge ahead in its economic reforms and
development largely hinges on how rapidly and successfully the government structures
the financial markets. But nevertheless, China seems destined to develop into a
powerful economic presence, with its economy performing well in the next decade as
in the last.
Although China's economic reforms are creating millionaires and are providing
more funds for public works projects, the country is still facing significant issues.
The most apparent problems involve rising worker unrest, peasant discontent and
severe corruption. China watchers believe these serious problems, left unresolved,
could result in the eventual collapse of the current dynasty in power (i.e., the
Communist Party).

CHAPTER VI
IS CHINA HEADING FO R COLLAPSE?
"For the last four millennia, the dynastic cycle has been the dominant pattern
o f Chinese history" (WuDunn & Kristof, 1994, p. 131). The "dynastic cycle" was a
theory first introduced by Duke Zhou who lived during the twelfth century B.C. His
family having defeated the current dynasty needed justification for their extreme
actions. Apparently the Duke dreamed up a very clever rationalization concerning
why a dynasty must be replaced by another ruling family. He reasoned that all new
dynasties have the divine blessing of the gods, but are charged with certain
responsibilities and duties regarding the people. When the ruling dynasty failed to
meet those obligations, heaven rescinds their "Mandate of Heaven" and transfers it to
a new leadership. Therefore, when a dynasty is overthrown or falls apart, people
should recognize it as a sign that the current leadership has lost its mandate because
they have failed to honor the people with esteem and respect (WuDunn & Kristof,
1994).
Historians believe the whole notion of the Mandate of Heaven is much older
than the Magna Carta and has had an important impact on worldwide political
ideology. It has basically provided the rationale for resistance and coups against
oppressive leaders. "The philosopher Mencius, who lived in the third and fourth
centuries B.C., further defined the notion of the Mandate of Heaven and of an explicit
right of rebellion. All this imposes is a check on the absolute rule of the emperors:
They have an obligation to be decent." (WuDunn & Kristof, 1994, p. 132).
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Lord Acton said: "Absolute power corrupts absolutely". Chinese rulers have
traditionally ruled absolutely, each one recognized as the Son of Heaven. Therefore,
no mortal person would even consider questioning their actions or pointing out their
mistakes. Chinese history has shown that dynasties fell not because of unscrupulous
minor mistakes, but their downfall was due to monumental blunders like the Opium
War with Great Britain or the Taiping Rebellion that lasted fourteen years and killed
millions of people .
Because China currently lacks a free press, church leaders or strong
educational network to water down its absolute control, the Communist Party has been
the primary faction behind all actions. Unfortunately, the Communist Party leaders,
like past emperors, live in virtual isolation from the population and have very little
understanding of what is really going on outside the walls of the Forbidden City.
This isolation has been the major cause of their poor decisions that are based on
misinformation and rumors passed to the leaders through other misguided Party
members. As a result, the Party leadership has made serious mistakes and
monumental blunders, like the Tiananmen Incident (WuDunn & Kristof). Many
observers believe that the Communist dynasty has lost the "Mandate of Heaven" and
is in jeopardy of collapsing.
This belief is evidenced by a variety of problems that are surfacing everyday.
For example, as in the Qing Dynasty, the official faith is slowly dying. In this case,
the official faith is Communism. Experts feel that today there are very few who
actually support or believe in Communism. Superstition also has a great deal to do

53
with collapsing dynasties. Traditionally, the gods send signs that a dynasty is failing
by creating natural disasters and other strange happenings. As a result, the Chinese
people have become very superstitious and rumors often run rampant throughout the
country. Current rumors such as crab landings, earthquakes, and an American made
robotic monster that devours little children are examples of the kind of stories being
circulated. The increase of superstition has been historically linked to a breakdown of
traditional beliefs. The Chinese economy and its societal norms are rapidly changing,
and the people are confused about their values and traditional morality.

Belief in

Mao and Communism continues to shrink, but so far nothing has surfaced to replace
it.
Whenever a dynasty is disintegrating, it begins to lose its hold on the country.
There is evidence of this happening all over China. In small villages and in major
areas such as Tibet and Xinjiang the people are challenging the Communist Party's
control and authority and virtually no one supports or believes in Communism
(WuDunn & Kristof).
Although many would like to see the Communist Party fall, they are seriously
concerned about what would replace it. China watchers have warned that major chaos
in China could cause massive migrations, resulting in catastrophic events occurring in
neighboring countries. So most observers, aware that collapsing dynasties are
historically followed by years of turmoil and war, are more concerned with chaos than
the continued hard line stance by Communist leaders — which at least provides a
modicum stability.
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Traditionally, China has been held together by ideology and fear, but both are
continuing to erode, while corruption continues to wear away what is left of the
infrastructure of the old Chinese government (WuDunn & Kristof).

Peasant Discontent
The Communists have forgotten their original source of support — the
peasants. During the 1949 revolution to unseat the Nationalist government, the
peasants viewed the Communists as their saviors and energetically helped overthrow
the current regime. Now it seems that the very faction they helped into power is
oppressing them much in the same manner as the previous leadership. As a result,
many peasants are now finding themselves being exploited by the Communist Party.
Whereas the Communists were originally viewed as saviors to the peasants, they are
now quickly becoming the instruments of growing oppression.
China's leaders are keenly aware of the tremendous leverage the workers have
and the possibility of a general strike. They recognize that a charismatic leader could
easily appear and mobilize the workers to strike and shut down the economy. This
concern was clearly evidenced when the decision to send in tanks during the
Tiananmen protests were prompted by the growing participation by workers (WuDunn
& Kristof).
But the Communist Party continues to ignore the most important faction in
China — the peasants. The Party Leaders have principally focused their worries on
unhappy students, and workers because protests are usually held in large cities. But
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lately Chinese officials and foreign experts believe that the ongoing discontent in the
villages could signal serious trouble for the Communist Party.
Throughout the history of China, peasants uprisings have filled the history
books. The most recent uprising was about fifty years ago that installed the present
Communist leadership. From that time forward the Chinese leadership has focused its
primary efforts in urban centers on workers and restless students.
Although China's peasants represent the vast majority of the country's 1.2
billion inhabitants (over 800 million), relatively little is known about them.

Most

Chinese officials pay little, if any, attention to them and believe they are a fairly
happy and content group. Over the years peasants have rebelled because of one issue
or another, but most uprisings are small scale and receive little notice because usually
their goal is not to overthrow the government, but just to settle some small injustice.
However, Chinese leaders and China watchers are beginning to wonder if a peasant
revolt might occur in the near future — which could be the demise of the Communist
Party (WuDunn & Kristof).
Clearly, whenever there is a conflict between city dwellers and peasants, the
peasants always end up on the short end under Communism. For instance, the
government in an effort to appease city people and prevent protests, uses the money
generated from the peasants to provide subsidies to the city residents. Also, the
government used peasant money to support universities and other educational
facilities, while the countryside does not even have a school system. As a result,
nearly the entire peasant population is illiterate. Also when floods threatened cities,
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the government opened dikes and flooded villages causing more economic damage that
would have been inflicted on the cities. Millions were left homeless and thousands
died.
It is obvious that the Chinese government does not recognize the peasant
population as an important factor in its administration. When you examine the
participants in the Tiananmen Square incident, only intellectuals, university students
and workers were involved. The peasants role was as soldiers firing on the
protesters.
A government that chooses to ignore a segment that represents more than 80%
of its population is risking its own peril. The peasants are becoming increasingly
aware of this inequity and are searching for ways to even the playing field and get
control of their futures. Their unhappiness is causing them to grow bolder and more
aggressive by staging larger protests, attacking government offices, refusing to pay
outrageous taxes and fines and actually firing on government officials (WuDunn &
Kristof).

Widespread Corruption and Greed
A serious problem that only serves to amplify the general state of discontent
and unrest among China's population is corruption. Corruption is rampant throughout
the country and this corruption has a tremendous corrosive effect on the Chinese
political and social structure — and on the Chinese people. Corruption has not only
eroded community values but it is also seriously affecting the efficiency of China's
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internal mechanisms.
The problem stems from the fact that everyone seems to be absorbed by one
thought — getting rich. For example, Chinese journalists who once rallied for
freedom of the press, now write favorable articles in hopes of receiving a payoff.
Private business owners may complain about the taking of bribes by public officials,
but are increasingly devising ways to defraud the public. Even the peasants have been
affected by the corruption and greed. Some have opened brothels using kidnapped
women and girls who work as sex slaves while others are selling these women to
small villages throughout the country (WuDunn & Kristof).
While corruption is ubiquitous and considered a part of Chinese culture, there
are two reasons why the ordinary Chinese is infuriated by it. First, because income is
so low, bribes have a dramatic impact on living standards. For example, an official
taking bribes in the United States might double his income, but in China a corrupt
leader can earn twenty times his salary. Next, the people who benefit from corruption
are typically public servants, and their children or relatives (Overholt).
Whereas corruption and graft are not uncommon in undeveloped countries,
they are more threatening in China. Unlike other countries that realize their officials
are "on the take", at least they put them in office through democratic means.
Conversely, in China, the leadership just seized power rather than legitimately being
elected into office.
Although an increasing number of Chinese are initiating measures to
undermine and change the Communist Party, the past has shown that killing off a
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reigning dynasty is not a quick or easy process — it can take years or even decades to
die (Overholt).
Nevertheless, today, most outsiders believe that China's growth is unstoppable
with few obstacles to prevent it from becoming the world's largest economy. But
others theorize that because China's current social and economic infrastructure is so
fragile, and its ideological platform so delicate, it may not be able to sustain much
more internal turbulence. They sense that the country's growing corruption, peasant
unrest, increasing unemployment and rising inflation could potentially spark another
incident like Tiananmen Square and escalate into total overthrow of the government
thereby propelling the nation into total chaos and possible collapse (Overholt).

CONCLUSION
Although the average Chinese has experienced an improvement in living
standards, China is still a repressive country with widespread abuses of basic human
rights. It still has a very long way to go, but no other country has progressed more
rapidly in the improvement of people's lives during the past 10 years. China's
situation today is comparable to South Korea a generation ago; the repression is real,
but the success and stability and glimmerings of freedom are real too (Overholt).
An ongoing debate concerning economic reforms and to what extent they
should be allowed to develop continues among China's top leaders. The outcome of
these debates will influence the course and future of the whole reform program, as
well as, Deng's successor. Opposition from conservatives is causing future
development to slow. Reform-minded officials, however, are quietly nurturing the
markets without seeking permission from the central government. Yet the
conservatives continue to block any market developments they consider especially
threatening. Government officials remain split: first one faction gets the upper hand,
then the other ("Taming the tiger").
In obvious contrast to previous sessions where the topic was "sustained, swift
and sound" economic development, the Fourth Party Plenum's meeting on September
28, 1994, involved politics, caution and a resurgence of central government control,
or limited democracy. Party members stressed "safeguarding central authority" and
"forcefully implementing the party line, principles and policies" (Chen, 1994b).
This change in attitude stems in part from growing problems concerning
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economic reforms that have been responsible for double digit inflation, high
unemployment and an ever widening wealth gap. The party's answer is to shift the
focus from making money back to a more communistic ideology and conservative
posture. In addition, members are concerned about maintaining stability and firmly
establishing the party ahead of the eventual death of Deng Xiaoping (Chen, 1994a).
The prosperous Chinese economy and profitable stock market have certainly
refocused Chinese citizens on capitalism rather than rebellion. In addition, they have
sparked a boom in foreign direct investment in Chinese companies and the purchase of
corporate stock. But with all its success the stock market still needs tighter
regulations, valid financial reporting system and increased controls or it will risk
future crashes (Overholt).

Future of China's Reforms
For the first time in China's history large numbers of foreigners and trading
partners have chosen to connect their future fortunes to China's. And China is still
moving toward solutions based on market approaches in its economic reforms
concerning state-owned enterprises, prices, foreign trade, financial markets, fiscal
policies and administrative reorganization.
Although it looks likely that China will successfully continue its reforms, the
country still faces many internal problems. Experts believe the biggest threat comes
from an overheating of the economy resulting in higher inflation. This will definitely
cause a slowdown, especially in the financial sector and in price liberalization. But if
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China implements measures to slow expansion - such as raising interest rates -- it
could sufficiently cool growth and reduce inflation (Overholt).
Another serious danger to China's continued success is corruption. Corruption
is seemingly widespread and it has blossomed with the radical economic changes. If
and when the Chinese Communist Party fails, experts believe that corruption will be a
major factor. Add to the concerns of hyperinflation and corruption — massive
unemployment, ongoing ideological questions, possible peasant revolt and conditions
appear right for internal fragmentation or another revolution.
Internal fragmentation could be economic, with the resource rich coastal cities
breaking off from the rest of the country. This could result in trade obstacles between
provinces and taxation would then be handled by local government. This also might
spark a succession by Tibet and parts of Xinjiang.
Another potential area of fragmentation could include China's seven military
regions. If these regions break-off, they could each turn into a military as well as a
political stronghold with Beijing becoming only a facade of central government. But
because some areas have richer resources than others, this situation could cause
conflicts and potential civil wars between provinces ("China survey", 1995).
But assuming Beijing can introduce effective measures to successfully manage
these dilemmas and keep the country together ~ an underlying problem still remains.
The incompleteness of economic reform and the absence of political reform have
created tensions between China's economic and political systems. So, the overriding
question is — will the Communist Party dismiss the old measures that reinforce the
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role o f central government which are anti-reform and openly embrace decentralization
and development which encourage reform?
If the Chinese leadership cannot resolve this highly important issue it will
continue to stand in the way of China's future. Any impediment to economic reform
could be perceived as a liability, in which case political change - of a controlled or
an uncontrolled kind - may be fast approaching.

REFERENCES

Agency ranks China's economy no. 3 in world.
Street Journal Weekly, p. A5.

Bears in a China shop.

Cook, A.
p. 17.

(1994, May).

(1992, July).

(1993, May 27).

Asian Wall

The Economist, p. 75.

Money visits the wild Shenzhen exchange.

Chen, K.
(1994a, July 14).
Journal, p. A10.

Chinese politicians jockey for position.

Money.

Wall Street

Chen, K. (1994b, September 29). Chinese Communists turn cautious in attempt to
bolster party's influence. Wall Street Journal, p. A 10.

China survey.

(1995, March 18).

Dorn, J., & Xi, W. eds.
Cato Institute.

(1990).

The Economist, p. 22.

Economic reform in China.

Evans, M .K. (1993, June).
Quarterly, pp. 64-65.

The great wall (street) of China.

Jia, D.

Japan Economic Newswire.

(1994, August 16).

Chicago:

The

Gentlemen's

Kahn, J. (1994, July 25). Brokers see further drop in China's stock markets.
The Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, p. 22.

Kaye, L. (1994, August 18).
p. 58.

Yo-yo markets.

63

Far Eastern Economic Review.

64
Mooney, P. (1993, June 3). Raging bulls: China's stockmarket crazecatches on in
provinces. Far Eastern Economic Review, p. 59.

Naisbitt, J. (1994).

Neumeier, S.

Global Paradox. New York: Avon Books.

(1993, August 23).

A new day dawning.

A bear in the China shop?

(1992, January).

Fortune,

The Economist, p. 82.

Overholt, W. H. (1993). China - the next economic superpower.
Orion Publishing Group Ltd.

Open outcry: China's stockmarkets.

(1993, August).

The road from Tiananmen: China's Communists.
p. 19.

(1994 June, 4).

(1994a, October).

Bulls go wild in a China shop.

Shale, T.

(1994b, October).

Is Shanghai in for a surprise?

(1993, February).

The Economist.

Euromonev. p. 56.

Euromonev.

p. 59.

The Economist, p. 73.

Why the Chinese are making it while the Russians aren't.
Business Times, p. 32.

WuDunn, S., & Kristof, N. D.
Books.

London: The

The Economist, p. 24.

Shale, T.

Taming the tiger.

p. 26.

(1994).

Yebi, H. (1993). China's capital market.
The Chinese University Press.

(1993, April).

China Wakes.

Singapore

New York: Time

Shatin, New Territories, Hong Kong:

